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I. HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS OF POPULATION POLICIES
Until recently, the human rights implications of population policies
have received relatively little attention by those formulating and
implementing such policies and, indeed, by human rights advocates.
The major debates in the population field have focused on issues such
as what are the best contraceptive methods to achieve a lowered
birthrate and the best ways to deliver those methods; whether greater
emphasis should be placed on economic and social development as
opposed to the provision of family planning; whether it is acceptable
to include abortion services in family planning programs; and whether
there even exists any population "problem."' The effects of popula-
tion policies on the human rights of persons who are the intended
beneficiaries of such policies historically have received little discus-
sion.2
* Editor-in-Chief of the Annual Review of Population Lawjointly published by the United
Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and Harvard Law School.
1. See generally PETERJ. DONALDSON, NATURE AGAINST US: THE UNITED STATES AND THE
WORLD POPULATION CRISIS, 1965-1980 (1990);Jason L. Finkle & Barbara B. Crane, Ideology and
Politics at Mexico City: The United States at the 1984 International Conference on Population, 11 POP.
& DEv. REV. 1, 1-27 (1985); Jason L. Finkle & Barbara B. Crane, The Politics of Bucharest:
Population, Development, and the New International Economic Order, 1 PoP. & DEv. REV. 87, 87-114
(1975); Donald P. Warwick, The Ethics of Population Control, in POPULATION POUCY: CONTEMPO-
RARY ISSUES 21 (Godfrey Roberts ed., 1990).
2. It is true that many population policies and documents have invoked human rights.
The two major international documents on population, the World Population Plan of Action
(WPPA) and the Recommendations for the Further Implementation of the Plan, for example,
contain several references to human rights. UNITED NATIONS, REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS
WORLD POPULATION CONFERENCE (1974); UNITED NATIONS, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
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There are a number of reasons for this state of affairs. One is the
nature and history of the population movement, which traditionally
has viewed its task in narrow terms.3 Convinced that high population
growth rates impede socioeconomic development, leaders have
tended to concentrate on the provision of contraceptive services in
order to lower the birthrate, thus achieving greater economic growth
and improved social welfare. Individual human rights issues associat-
ed with such policies have been subordinated to these concerns,
except insofar as they may converge with the desire of individuals to
adopt family planning methods. Contraceptive acceptors and
demographic targets have been the focus of most attention, while
incentives and disincentives have been viewed as playing an important
role, with coercion justified in some cases.
A second factor is the relegation of the kinds of human rights
perceived to be implicated in population policies to second-class
status. These rights often have been classified as social and economic
rights or women's rights, to which large parts of the human rights
community have historically accorded less attention than civil and
political rights.' These rights, moreover, have been viewed as private
rather than public rights, involving private behavior unsuitable for the
attention of human rights advocates.' Until very recently, interna-
tional human rights organizations concentrated almost exclusively on
the investigation and reporting of violations of civil and political
rights, including such issues as torture, unjust imprisonment, and
political persecution, rather than combatting serious abuses perpetrat-
ed against women in less public settings.
6
CONFERENCE ON POPULATION (1984). These references, however, are usually very general in
nature, or are so qualified by language relating to national sovereignty, national goals and
values, prohibitions against external interference, and responsible parenthood as to have little
practical meaning. See generally Reed Boland et al., Honoring Human Rights in Population Policies:
FromDeclaration toAction, in POPULATION POLICIES RECONSIDERED: HEALTH, EMPOWERMENT, AND
RIGHTS 89 (Gita Sen et a. eds., 1994).
3. See generally DONALDSON, supra note 1; see also RUTH DIXON-MUELLER, POPULATION
POLICY & WOMEN'S RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE (1993); BETSY HARTMANN,
REPRODUcrIVE RIGHTS AND WRONGS: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF POPULATION CONTROL AND
CONTRACEPTIVE CHOICE (1987).
4. ARTHUR H. ROBERTSON &JOHN G. MERRILLs, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD (1989); see
also Richard L Siegel, Socioeconomic Human Rights: Past and Future, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 255, 255-67
(1985).
5. SeeRebeccaJ. Cook, InternationalHuman Rights and Women 's ReproductiveHealth, 24 STUD.
FAM. PLAN. 75,73-86 (1993); see also Karen Engle, InternationalHuman Rights and Feminism: When
Discourses Meet; 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 517, 517-610 (1992).
6. Boland et al., supra note 2; see also, e.g., IAN MARTIN, THE NEV WORLD ORDER:
OPPORTUNITYOR THREAT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (1993); Charlotte Bunch, Women's Rights as Human
Rights: Toward a Re-vision of Human Rights, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 486,486-98 (1990); Cook, supra note
5, at 73-86.
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One result of this lack of focus on human rights in population
policies has been the widespread violation of human rights. "At the
same time that countries have proclaimed their adherence to human
rights, they have carried out repressive population policies-policies
that have" had a destructive impact on the lives of individuals,
particularly women, who are the persons most immediately affected
by the implementation of population policies.'
One of the worst offenders in this respect has been Romania, which
until 1990 was pursuing one of the most oppressive pronatalist
population policies in the world.' Believing that a steadily increasing
rate of population growth was necessary for continued socioeconomic
development, and worried by Romania's falling birthrate, the
Government imposed harsh demographic measures that prohibited
most abortions and forms of contraception. At the height of this
policy, the Government instituted forced gynecological examinations
in the workplace and monitored pregnancies to ensure that no
abortions would occur. The result of these measures was tragic: a
maternal mortality rate of 148.8 per thousand, by far the highest in
Europe; the highest infant mortality rate in Europe at twenty-six per
thousand; at least 500 deaths per year due to unsafe, illegal abortions;
thousands of women suffering from the consequences of such
abortions; and twice the expected number of women suffering from
sterility.9 In addition, tens of thousands of newborn children were
abandoned because they were unwanted or their parents could not
afford to keep them. Most eventually found their way to state
orphanages, where they lived in substandard conditions without basic
7. Boland et al., supra note 2, at 95. A number of governments, chief among them China,
are convinced that their successes in decreasing the rate of population growth are in significant
part due to the coercive measures they have imposed on their populations. They argue that
individual freedom to choose in matters of reproduction must be curbed to guarantee the
economic and social welfare of future generations. In other words, injustice caused by
restriction of the right to reproduction is less important than the injustices caused by an
overpopulated world with dwindling resources. This is the explicit conclusion of the population
section in a recent human rights statement issued by China. Xinhua General News Service,
WHrrE PAPER ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Nov. 2, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
For further discussion, see Boland et al., supra note 2, at 96.
8. See Reed Boland, Recent Deelopments in Abortion Law in Industrialized Countries, 18 LAW,
MED. & HEALTH CARE 404, 411-12 (1990); see also Henry P. David, Abortion in Europe, 1920-91:
A Public Health Perspectiv 23 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 1, 1-22 (1992). At the very time that President
Ceausescu was hosting the 1974 World Population Conference he was further tightening this
policy.
9. UNITED NATIONS, DEMOGRAPHICYEARBOOK, 1987, at 387 (1989); see alsoUNIrED NATIONS
POPULATION FUND, REPORT ON MISSION TO ROMANIA MARcH 5-15, 1990, cited in C. Hord et al.,
Reproductive Health in Romania: Reversing the Ceausescu Legacy, 22 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 231 (1991).
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hygiene, heat, medicines, and food. Often they were exposed to HIV
infection.' °
Lest one conclude that forced childbearing is an isolated phenome-
non that disappeared with the fall of the Ceausescu regime, it should
be noted that similar policies were in effect in Albania until 1991 and
produced similar results." Some in Poland currently justify that
country's new restrictive abortion law by the need to raise the rate of
population growth, which has continued to drop in recent years,
despite the new law.'2 Moreover, in a significant part of the world
(particularly Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East), access to
abortion is severely restricted or banned outright, and means of
contraception often are not readily available.'" According to
estimates of the World Health Organization, as many as 200,000
women die each year from the effects of poorly performed abortions,
while many more experience complications. 4
In some respects a mirror image of Romania, but equally flagrant
in its human rights violations, China has pursued the most aggressive
antinatalist population policy in the world.'5 In China, coercion
plays a key role in government population planning and takes many
forms. Much of it is psychological in nature and is addressed to
women who are perceived to be violating the mandates of the one-
child-per-couple policy adopted by the Central Government.' 6 They
typically are subjected to the intense pressure of neighbors, co-
workers, family planning officials, and Communist party members to
modify their behavior by agreeing to use contraception-most often
IUDs (which they are forbidden to remove)-undergo sterilization,
or, if they are pregnant and already have one child, obtain an
10. See Boland, supra note 8, at 404-18; see also David, supra note 8, at 1-22.
11. See Reed Boland, Abortion Law in Europe in 1991-199Z 21 J.L. MED. & ETHIcS 2, 76-77
(1993). Bulgaria enacted similar legislation, although without the health consequences
experienced in Romania and Albania. See Boland, supra note 8, at 404-18.
12. See Population Policy for Coming Years Drafted, PAP Polish Press Agency (PAP Newswire),
July 25, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
13. See Stanley K. Henshaw, Induced Abortion: A World Review, 1990, 22 FAM. PLAN, PERSP.
76, 77-78 (1990); see also Reed Boland, Abortion Law World-wide: A Survey of Recent Developments,
in FEsTscHRIFr FORJAN STEPAN 89 (J. Bednarikova & F. C. Chapman ed., 1994).
14. See CARLA ABOUZAHR & ERICA ROYSTON, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, MATERNAL
MORTALITY: A GLOBAL FACTBOOK (1991).
15. See, e.g., JOHN S. AIRD, SLAUGHTER OF THE INNOCENTS 1 (1990); JUDITH BANISTER,
CHINA'S CHANGING POPULATION (1987); Tyrene White, PostrevolutionayMobilization in China: The
One-Child Polioy Reconsidered, 43 WORLD POL. 53 (1990).
16. There are many exceptions to the one-child policy, particularly for ethnic minorities and
the rural population. The policy was briefly relaxed in the mid-1980s, but soon thereafter
strengthened. SeeNicholas D. Kristof, China's Crackdown onBirths;A Stunning, and Harsh, Success,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25,1993, atAl; Uli Schmetzer, In Controlling China's Population, Girls "Disappear,"
CH. TRIB., Apr. 27, 1993, at 1.
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abortion. Often this pressure is accompanied by explicit or implicit
threats of physical force. In some cases, actual physical force is
applied and women have been ordered to have an abortion or
undergo sterilization. Indeed, many local laws call for such measures
in response to violations of family planning guidelines.' Local laws
also call for the sterilization of the mentally retarded.'8 In addition,
the Government withholds various privileges, among them medical,
educational, and housing benefits, from those who fail to adhere to
guidelines, and imposes fines to force compliance. One result has
been an increase in female infanticide and the abortion of female
fetuses after the performance of prenatal tests, as many couples
limited to having one child would prefer it to be male.'
9
Technology designed to increase contraceptive options has also
resulted in human rights abuses when used improperly. Almost all
forms of contraceptives have potential adverse side effects, and
education, counseling, screening, and follow-up care must be
provided if they are to be safely prescribed. In many parts of the
developing world, little of this is available. The experience of
Indonesia with Norplant offers an instructive example. A recent
report issued by the National Family Planning Coordinating Board
described serious deficiencies in the program, including: physicians
17. See, e.g., Family PlanningRegulations, inJOINT PUB. RES. SERVICE,JPRS-CHI-87-044 (Sept.
8, 1987); Henan Provincial Rules and Regulations on Family Planning, in FOREIGN BROADCAST INFO.
SERV., FBIS-CHI-90-106 (June 1, 1990) [hereinafter Henan RulesJ; Wolfgang Kessler, In gebsten
Galopp ins Jahr des Pferdes: Neves Recht der Geburten planning in der VR China, 23 VERFASSUNG UND
RECHT IN UBERSEE 109, 112-26 (1990) (listing Zhejian's new family planning ordinance).
18. See Henan Rules, supra note 17, art. 22; Nicholas D. Kristof, Chinese Region Uses New Law
to Sterilize Mentally Retarded, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1989, at 1. In December 1993, the Government
of China unveiled a draft of a eugenics law for the entire country. Among the measures to be
used were sterilizations and abortions. Due to foreign criticism, the Government subsequently
disavowed portions of the draft. See Steven Mufson, China Softens Bill on Eugenics, WASH. POST,
Dec. 30, 1993, at A17.
On October 27,1994, the Government enacted a revised version of this draft, entitled the Law
of the People's Republic of China on Maternal and Infant Health Care. Law on Materna Infant
Health Care Aims to Improve the Quality of Births, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS (Nov. 3,
1994), FE/2143/S1 pt. 3. Although some of the more objectionable language of the draft was
removed or toned down, the law still provides that health care facilities are likely to affect
marriage and reproduction, including serious hereditary diseases, legal contagious diseases, and
relevant medical disorders. If a person is diagnosed as having a serious hereditary disease
deemed medically unsuitable for reproduction, he or she will be allowed to marry only after
taking long-lasting contraceptive measures or being sterilized. Health care facilities also are
required to provide fetal monitoring for pregnant women, and, if they discover that a fetus has
contracted a serious hereditary disease or has a serious deformity, they are supposed to advise
that the pregnancy be terminated. The adoption of rules for implementation of the law is left
to the discretion of local governments, which, presumably, could retain much more explicitly
coercive rules already in effect. Id.
19. See Nicholas D. Kristof, Peasants in ChinaDiscover a New Way to Weed Out Girls, N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 1993, at 1, 6; see also Schmetzer, supra note 16, at 1; cf. Jeffrey Wasserstrom, Resistance to
the One-Child Family, 10 MOD. CHINA 345 (1984).
THE AMERICAN UNrvERsrrY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1257
and program personnel who lacked basic knowledge of the drug and
basic training in its use; recipients who had not been properly
examined, screened, counseled, or informed about the drug;
substandard and unsanitary conditions in dispensing the drug, among
them the reuse of portable syringes; and lack of responsiveness to
complaints and requests for removal of the drug.20 In addition,
Norplant has been administered in part by means of "safaris." These
are operations in which family planning personnel and soldiers enter
a village, gather the populace together, and lecture upon the
advantages of family planning, often with an implied threat that the
village will be punished if family planning methods are not adopted.
Safaris historically have played an important part in Indonesia's family
planning program, typically resulting in mass acceptance by village
women of contraception-often of the one kind being promoted at
that particular moment by the Government. 21
Given the recent widespread publicity of these sorts-of abuses, there
has bedn a growing recognition that population policies have a
profound impact on human rights and, indeed, may succeed or fail
on the basis of the way in which they are able to incorporate human
rights concerns.2 2  As the above examples illustrate, the most
fundamental of these concerns is that of reproductive rights. Central
to almost all discussions of population policies has been the idea that
the reproductive capacities of individuals must be regulated. That is,
in order to lower or, more rarely, raise the birthrate, ways must be
found to change the rate of reliance on family planning meth-
ods-most commonly by increasing the use of contraception. Such
ways, of necessity, have important implications on the basic rights of
people to control their own fertility and bodies, and to make
decisions about whether and when to have children.3 These
20. See NATIONAL FAMILY PLANNING COORDINATING BOARD OF INDONESIA, 1992 INDONESIA
NORPLANT USE DYNAMICS STUDY, FINAL REPORT (1993).
21. Se4 eg., Arthur Caplan, The Norplant Safaris: Birth Control Implant Leads to Population
Control by Governments, SEATTLE TIMES, July 7, 1991, at A13; Leah Makabenta, Indonesia:
Population Success Story Has Its Shady Side INTER PRESS SERVICE, Nov. 5, 1992, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Arcnws File; Dave Todd, Expert Sounds Alarm on Indonesian Birth-Control Program,
THE GAZETTE (Montreal), Nov. 26, 1991, at Al.
22. Key among tlose lobbying for a human rights approach to population policy has been
the international women's health movement. See Clandis Garcfa-Moreno & Amparo Claro,
Challenges from the Women's Health Movement: Women's Rights Versus Population Control in
POPULATION POLICIES RECONSIDERED, supra note 2, at 47. Participants in that movement have
produced a document outlining their human rights approach to population policies. See
Adrienne Germaine et al., Setting a New Agenda: Sexual and Reproductive Rights, in POPULATION
POLICIES RECONSmERED, supra note 2, at 31.
23. In addition, other human rights are implicated in population policies: the right to
health, particularly reproductive health; the right in some instances to education, housing,
nutrition, and social benefits; and, most notably, the rights, apart from reproductive concerns,
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implications often have been ignored in the past due to concerns with
demographic goals, numbers of acceptors of family planning,
incentives and disincentives, and the single-minded provision of
contraception.
Despite a common perception to the contrary, reproductive rights
find strong support in international human rights documents, even
though such rights are rarely mentioned by name. The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 4 the international human
rights document accorded the greatest respect by human rights
proponents, for example, contains guarantees that are highly relevant
to reproduction. Among these are the right to life;' the right to
not be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or medical or scientific experimentation without consent;26 the right
not to be held in servitude;2 7 the right to liberty and security of
person;28 the right not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with privacy or the family;' and the right to marry and
found a family."0 In addition, in three different articles, the Cove-
nant guarantees the right to be free from discrimination on the basis
of sex.3'
Each of these rights implies a right to make fully voluntary decisions
about childbearing and, if properly conceptualized, bears directly on
the protection of women from unsafe abortion possibly resulting in
death, coercive family planning measures, untested or possibly
harmful methods of contraception, and denial of the means to plan
a family.12  There are many examples of how these rights can be
applied. Death caused by unsafe abortion is as serious as death
resulting from political persecution. Damage to health caused by
of women. These rights are categorized as the right to participate equally and fully in all areas
of society and to be able to shape their own lives. This includes equal rights with respect to
education, employment, nationality, family relations, property, political life, inheritance, and
land tenure.
24. Civil and Political Covenant, infra doc. biblio.
25. Civil and Political Covenant, infra doc. bibio., art. 6(1).
26. Civil and Political Covenant, infra doc. biblio., art. 7.
27. Civil and Political Covenant, infra doc. bib!io., art. 8(2).
28. Civil and Political Covenant, infra doc. biblio., art. 9(1).
29. Civil and Political Covenant, infra doc. bib!io., art. 17(1).
30. Civil and -Political Covenant, infra doc. biblio., art. 23(2).
31. Civil and Political Covenant, infra doc. biblio., arts. 2(1), 23(3), 24(2).
32. The right to health guaranteed in the Economic Covenant, infra doc. bibio., art. 12, is
also highly relevant to reproductive rights. For example, it can be applied to protect women
from family planning measures that have resulted in injury or danger to health, such as unsafe
or untested methods of contraception. See Civil and Political Covenant, infra doc. biblio., art. 7.
Many other international human rights treaties contain similar provisions. For a full discussion
of human rights treaty provisions and their applicability to reproductive health issues and
women's health, see REBECCAJ. COOK, WOMEN'S HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1994).
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uninformed use of unsafe contraception constitutes medical experi-
mentation without consent, as well as cruel and degrading treatment.
Coerced family planning, including forced abortion, is as much an
invasion of privacy and a violation of liberty and security of one's
person as is unjust imprisonment or government censorship of private
correspondence. Coerced parenthood is a very real form of servitude
to the mother. Similarly, the right to freedom from sex discrimina-
tion is infringed if a person is forced to undertake or refrain from
undertaking certain behavior related to reproduction, such as
abortion or family planning, solely because that person is a woman
capable of bearing a child. This right is also infringed if a woman can
obtain contraception or an abortion only if her husband or a male
relative approves. Despite their private aspects, these are true
violations of civil and political rights, and are the result of specific
policies consciously imposed by governments. They are as serious and
as oppressive as more traditionally acknowledged violations of human
rights.
Indeed, with the 1979 adoption by the United Nations of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women,3 the connection between formal human rights and
reproductive rights has been made explicit. The Convention
guarantees, on the basis of equality of men and women,' the right
to access information on health and information and advice on family
planning; 5 the right to protection of the function of reproduc-
tion; 6 the right of access to health care services, including family
planning; 7 and the right to decide freely and responsibly on the
number and spacing of their children and to have access to the
education and means to exercise these rights.3"
II. APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ARGUMENTS
TO POPULATION POLICIES
In some sense the application of these human rights arguments and
treaty provisions is in a stage of infancy. Outside of the United States
human rights strategies seldom have been used to challenge repressive
reproductive health policies. Nonetheless, there are signs that this
33. See Women's Convention, infra doc. biblio.
34. Women's Convention, infra doc. bibHo., pmbl.
35. Women's Convention, infra doc. bibio., art. 10.
36. Women's Convention, infra doc. bibio., art. 11.
37. Women's Convention, infra doc. bib!io., art. 12.
38. Women's Convention, infra doc. bibio., art. 16. The Convention also gives special
protection in health and family planning to rural women. Id. art. 14.
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situation is changing. Due to an increasing emphasis on human
rights in international and national discourse, the entry into force of
new treaties such as the Women's Convention, and recent develop-
ments in constitutional reform that have resulted in the establishment
of stronger national human rights protections and mechanisms, it is
becoming easier to use the legal system to challenge violations of
reproductive rights.
On the international level, for example, the United Nations and
regional intergovernmental organizations have established bodies to
monitor treaty compliance and issue official interpretations of various
treaty provisions.3 9 In addition, the Human Rights Committee, the
monitoring body for the Civil and Political Covenant, is competent to
receive individual complaints of human rights abuses alleged by
individuals in countries that accept the jurisdiction of the Committee.
Regional bodies in Europe and the Western Hemisphere are similarly
competent to hear such claims.' The Commission on Human
Rights recently appointed a Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women, empowered to investigate and recommend measures to deal
with violations in this area, including those in private life.4'
Bringing individual complaints under these treaties is time-
consuming and cumbersome, while enforcement procedures, both
with respect to judicial decisions and treaty interpretation, are weak.
It therefore may be more practical in some cases to bring about
positive change by initiating local legal actions that invoke internation-
al human rights standards or their local variations. 2 There are also,
however, serious obstacles to utilizing this approach. Among them
are the lack of an independent parliament orjudiciary, fledgling legal
systems ill-equipped to deal with human rights and constitutional
challenges to local laws and policies, and ambiguity as to the
applicability to domestic law of treaty provisions ratified by govern-
ments. Nonetheless, this approach has been employed recently in a
number of situations with varying degrees of success. Examination of
four such efforts illustrates the specific legal strategies employed to
redress major violations of reproductive rights, as well as some of the
39. See Women's Covenant, infra doc. biblio., arts. 17-22; Civil and Political Covenant, infra
doe. biblio., art. 44.
40. See Civil and Political Covenant, infra doc. biblio., art. 20; European Convention, infra doc.
biblio., arts. 19-55; American Convention, infra doc. biblio., chs. 6-8.
41. U.N.-Human Rights: Official to Campaign Against Domestic Viwlence, INTER PRESS SERVICE,
July 9, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
42. See Cook, supra note 5, at 73-86. In addition, before an individual complaint can be
brought before the Human Rights Committee, a complainant must exhaust local remedies.
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problems, both procedural and conceptual, faced by those working
towards these changes.
A. Restrictions on Abortion
The first example of the use of a human rights approach to bring
about legal change at the local level involves one of a number of
ongoing efforts to reform the restrictive abortion laws that still exist
in many parts of the developing world. In 1992, a challenge was
brought against the constitutionality of Colombia's abortion law,
which prohibits the performance of all abortions and subjects both
the pregnant woman and the person carrying out the abortion to one
to three years' imprisonment.43 The plaintiff argued that this
blanket prohibition, among the strictest in the world,4' violated
provisions of Colombia's Constitution. The constitutional provisions
in question guarantee the right of couples to decide freely and
responsibly the number of their children' and the rights to freedom
of conscience and religion, which the plaintiff asserted included the
right of individuals to conduct their lives in conformity with their
innermost judgments.' The plaintiff also claimed that the right to
life guaranteed in Article 2.2 of the Constitution did not protect the
"unborn"47 because in the eyes of the law, a person is a physical
being that has been born and has lived outside of the womb.4"
In a March 1994 split decision with a lengthy dissenting opinion,
the Constitutional Court rejected this challenge.49 The Court began
its analysis of the issues with a discussion of the right to life, which it
concluded was the most valued of all rights and was protected by the
Colombian Constitution from conception. It stated in emphatic terms
that, given this fact, the State had an obligation to establish an
effective legal system of protection for this right from conception and
43. C6DIGO PENAL It states: "Article 343. Abortion. A woman who causes her own
abortion or permits another person to cause it, is liable to one to three years' imprisonment.
Whoever, with the consent of the woman, carries out the act referred to in the previous
paragraph is liable to the same punishment." Id. art. 343. The penalty is lowered to four
months to one year if the pregnancy is the result of violent or abusive sexual intercourse or
involuntary artificial insemination. Id. art. 345.
Article 344 states: "Abortion without consent. Whoever causes an abortion without the
consent of the woman, or upon a woman under 14 years old, is liable to three to ten years'
imprisonment" Id. art. 344.
44. General principles of criminal law relating to necessity probably would allow an abortion
to be performed to save the life of the pregnant woman. Id. art. 29.
45. CoNsTITUcION POLiTICA COLOMBIA, art. 42,1 5, in CONSTITUTIONS OF TIE COUNTRIES
OF THE WORLD, Release 91-6 (Nov. 1991).
46. Id. arts. 18, 19.
47. Id. art. 22.
48. C6DIGO CIVIL art. 90.
49. Decision C-133, 23JURISPRUDENCIA Y DOCrRINA 745, 745-58 (Colom. 1994).
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that, in principle, this system must exclude the possibility of permit-
ting acts that voluntarily and directly are designed to end the life of
the unborn." The Court held that because unborn life is helpless,
it requires the special protection of the State.
Once it had reached this conclusion, the Court easily disposed of
the human rights arguments raised by the plaintiffs. First, countering
the assertion that the unborn are not persons, it pointed to provisions
in the Civil Code and the Code of Minors that specifically give
protection to the unborn.5' It then stated that the right to decide
freely and responsibly about the number of children and the right to
freedom of conscience and religion are less important rights than the
right to life. The Court opined that the former can be exercised only
before conception, while the latter may be exercised only when there
is no interference with the rights of others, including the rights of the
unborn. Moreover, turning the tables on the plaintiffs, the Court
itself resorted to human rights discourse to support its decision.
Noting that Article 93 of the Colombian Constitution authorizes the
use of international treaties to which Colombia is a party in interpret-
ing human rights provisions of the Constitution, it cited language in
both the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the American
Convention on Human Rights to demonstrate that the treaties confer
various protections on unborn life."
The outcome of the case raises important issues. One, alluded to
earlier, is the ability and willingness of local courts to examine
challenges based on women's reproductive rights. Legal mechanisms
must exist within which to use human rights arguments and obtain a
fair hearing. Colombia is in some ways unusual in this respect. It
50. For its conclusion that life begins at conception, the Court relied on the views of only
one person,Jerome Lejeune, a professor of basic genetics at the Ren6 Descartes University. The
Court also interpreted Colombia's Constitution as providing for protection of conception
because the Constitution does not state otherwise. To support this interpretation, the Court
pointed to the fact that when the Constitution was being drafted, a clause designed to give a
woman freedom in choosing whether to be a mother was rejected. The Court also highlighted
constitutional provisions protecting the right to life of children and charging the State with
protecting women during pregnancy and after giving birth.
51. See C6DIGO CtVIL art. 91; see also C(5DIGO DEL MENOR art. 5.
52. The opinion of the majority in the case can be criticized on a number of grounds. For
example, it failed to consider more than one scientific opinion on the beginning of life. It
ignored evidence that the Assembly drafting the Constitution also rejected a proposed Article
that would have protected life from conception. It interpreted international human rights
documents in a superficial and misleading fashion. It failed to discuss the one case brought
under the American Convention on Human Rights that relates to the status of the unborn. See
Case 2141 (Baby Boy Case), OAS/Ser.L/V/I.52, doc. 48 (1981), reprinted in 2 HUm. RTS. LJ.
110 (1981) (ruling that language cited by Colombian Constitutional Court does not confer right
to life on unborn children). In addition, many of its arguments, particularly on the value of life,
are conclusory and unsupported.
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recently adopted a new Constitution that significantly widens the
opportunities for bringing such cases.5 3 The Constitution creates
new procedures for protecting human rights, including the right of
personal petition. It establishes a number of human rights that are
self-executing, and thus do not depend on government enactment of
legislation for enforcement. As the Court noted, the Constitution also
authorizes courts to use international documents to interpret these
rights. In addition, despite the rather absolutist tone of this ruling,
the Constitutional Court in Colombia appears to be reasonably
impartial in its decisions, and in other cases has adopted controversial
opinions.54 There are many countries where this congruence of
factors does not exist. In others, however, including a growing
number of countries with modem constitutions, this sort of challenge
is becoming more a fact of life.
A related issue is one of timing. Was it a good strategy for the
plaintiff to have brought this suit when he did, or should he have
waited until he might have had more chance of success? It is possible
that by initiating a challenge to Colombia's abortion law, he com-
pelled the Court to take a position that it otherwise might not have
taken. The Court's conclusions on the right to life of the unborn
may hamper future efforts by the Colombian legislature to reform the
abortion law." On the other hand, given that the dissenters in the
case wrote a well-reasoned argument favoring the liberalization of
Colombia's abortion law, it may be that the case for changing the
abortion law now has attained an aspect of moral legitimacy that it did
not possess before.
53. See, e.g., Donald T. Fox & Anne Stetson, The 1991 Constitutional Reform: Prospects for
Democracy and the Rule of Law in Colombia, 24 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 139 (1992); Martha I.
Morgan & Monica MA. Buitrago, Constitution-Making in a Time of Cholera: Women and the 1991
Colombian Constitution, 4 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 353 (1992); Keith S. Rosenn, A Comparison of the
Protection of Individual Rights in the New Constitutions of Colombia and Brazi4 23 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REV. 659 (1992).
54. See Decision No. C-221/94, 23JURISPRUDENCIA Y DOCrRINA 823 (Colom. 1994) (ruling
that penal provisions prohibiting consumption of drugs are unconstitutional); Decision No. C-
105/94, 23 JURISPRUDENCIA Y DOCTRINA 594 (Colom. 1994) (ruling that all legal provisions
making discriminations between children born in wedlock and out of wedlock are unconstitu-
tional); Decision No. T-097/94, 23JURisPRuDENCiA Y DocRINA 611 (Colom. 1994) (ruling that
fact that'person is homosexual, as opposed to engages in homosexual activities, in itself cannot
be used as reason for barring that person from armed forces); Decision T-505/92, 21
JURISFRUDENCIA Y' DOCrRINA 1101 (Colom. 1992) (ruling that public health services have
obligation to treat persons suffering from AIDS who are indigent).
55. Near the end of the opinion, the Court drew back a bit from its unstinting support for
the right to life. It acknowledged that there may be serious conflicts between the rights of the
unborn and the rights of women, and suggested that it is up to the legislature to resolve these
conflicts. Whether such a resolution could involve legal abortion under some circumstances
seems doubtful, given the Court's statements earlier in the decision.
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An important question in this sort of litigation is whether legal
action should be undertaken only in cases in which there is a very
good chance of prevailing. The purpose of such a strategy would be
to avoid blocking or delaying further legislative reforms, as well as to
lay the groundwork for future challenges when the force of human
rights arguments may be more fully acknowledged. Alternatively,
forcing the issue may be a better strategy.
A third issue raised by this case concerns the use of human rights
arguments and instruments by those supporting repressive policies to
rebut challenges to those policies. A plaintiff's application of such
arguments could open a Pandora's box of opposing applications that
is better left closed, and place a plaintiff in the dilemma of reading
to find ways to counter such applications. It is then difficult to
counter the use of such arguments. These considerations are
particularly crucial whenever a right to abortion is asserted based on
various rights enumerated in international treaties, as many of these
treaties also guarantee some sort of right to life that can -be cited. 5
In the Colombian case, that is exactly what the Court did by pointing
to the right to life provisions of the Colombian Constitution and two
international treaties. Plaintiffs need to find ways to deal effectively
with this contingency.7
B. Repressive Population Policies
A second example of the use of a human rights approach to bring
about legal change at the local level also involves court action, but of
a different sort: the claims of individuals who have fled a country due
to repressive population policies and seek asylum abroad. In recent
years, courts in several countries (among them Canada, the United
States, and Australia) have been faced with a growing number of
these asylum claims.58
Two Canadian cases with differing outcomes illustrate some of the
relevant issues. The earlier of the cases, Cheung v. Canada,9 involved
the asylum application of a woman who fled China in order to escape
56. For one example, see Civil and Political Covenant, infra doc. biblio., art. 6.
57. There are answers to these right-to-life arguments. Some involve legislative history of
the drafting of the conventions, the context in which they appear in the conventions, and case
law under the conventions.
58. In the United States, see, for example, Guo Chun Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858 (E.D.
Va. 1994), and Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 859 F. Supp. 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). In both cases,
the courts granted asylum to Chinese nationals fleeing their country because of persecution
related to family planning. For information on Australia, see Duncan Graham, Australia: Chinese
Refugee Forcibly Ftted with RID DeVice, THE AGE, July 2, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Txtanz File.
59. 2 F.C. 314, 325 (Fed. Ct. 1993).
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forced sterilization after she gave birth to her second child. Despite
believing her story, the Immigration Board that initially considered
her application denied her request for asylum. It ruled that she did
not have a well-founded fear of persecution on one of the grounds
provided for in the Immigration Act: "race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group. or political opinion."' It
held that because the one-child-per-couple policy was a law of general
application, the objective of which was population control, not
persecution, the applicant was not subjected to any treatment that
other Chinese citizens were not subject to if they violated the policy.
She thus was not part of a particular oppressed social group, as she
had claimed.
On appeal, the Federal Court reversed this decision." First,
relying on previous case law, the court determined that the applicant
did belong to a particular social group within the meaning of the law:
women in China who have one child and are faced with forced
sterilization.62 Second, it held that coerced sterilization is a form of
persecution, even if it results from the enforcement of a law of
general application.6' The court reasoned that persecution could be
present if the punishment under the law was so draconian as to be
completely disproportionate to the law's objectives. It concluded that
forced sterilization was such a punishment.'
To bolster its view of the persecutory nature of the Chinese
Government's actions, the court strongly invoked human rights as set
forth in both Canadian and international law. It turned first to
Articles 3 and 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
guarantee the right to "life, liberty and security of person"65 and the
right not to be subjected to "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment."66  The court characterized forced abortion as a
"serious and totally unacceptable violation of [the] security of the
person" and as "cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment."'67 It then
60. Id. at 317-19; see Immigration Act, R.S.C., ch. 1-2 (1985) (Can.).
61. Cheung v. Canada, 2 F.C. 314, 325 (Fed. Ct. 1993).
62. Id. at 322. It stated that such women share similar social status and hold a similar
interest not held by their Government, have basic characteristics in common, and are identified
by a purpose that is fundamental to their dignity, i.e., the desire to maintain their reproductive
liberty. Id.
63. Id. at 323.
64. Id. Before it reached this conclusion, the court also stated its belief that forced
sterilization in China was not the result of enforcement of a law of general application, but the
result of unauthorized acts ordered by overzealous local authorities. Id. at 322-23.
65. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, infra doe. biblio., art. 3.
66. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, infra do. bib/io., art. 5. This document is the
first international human rights treaty to be adopted after the Second World War.
67. Cheung 2 F.C. at 324.
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pointed to the Canadian decision Re Eve,' in which the Supreme
Court of Canada prohibited nontherapeutic sterilization of a mentally
disabled person as a serious intrusion on the basic rights of the
individual.69 The court concluded that the "practice of forcing
women to undergo sterilization is such an extreme violation of their
basic human rights as to be persecutory."7°
A subsequent decision of another panel of Canada's Federal Court
stood in contrast to this ruling.7  The plaintiff in that case was
another Chinese citizen, who, after agreeing to be sterilized when his
wife gave birth to a second child, fled the country.72 The court
rejected by a two-to-one vote the argument accepted in Cheung that
the plaintiff belonged to a particular social group with a well-founded
fear of persecution. The plaintiff had claimed that he was a member
of a group of parents in China with more than one child who
disagree with forced sterilization.71 Instead, the court ruled that the
plaintiff's fear was caused by something that he had done, not by his
status. It also disagreed with the conclusion in Cheung that violations
of basic human rights as the result of the application of a legitimate
state law could amount to persecution.74 This decision has been
appealed to the Canadian Supreme Court.75
These two cases raise several issues in addition to those raised by
the Colombian case. The most important of these relates to the
boundaries of human rights discourse. For example, it is not difficult
for most people to perceive coerced sterilization or abortion as a
human rights abuse. But what about less blatant forms of coercion
used by the Chinese and other governments to enforce population
policies? Does any of the following involve coercion of such a serious
nature as to amount to persecution: the withdrawal of social, health,
and employment benefits; the provision of incentives in the form of
68. 31 D.LR. 4th 1 (Fed. Ct. 1986).
69. Re Eve, 31 D.L.R. 4th 1, 37 (Fed. Ct. 1986).
70. Cheung 2 F.C. at 325.
71. Chan v. Canada, 3 F.C. 675 (Fed. Ct. 1993).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 690.
74. Id. at 696. The court also rejected an argument that the plaintiff had been persecuted
for expressing a political opinion. Id. at 693.95. It distinguished its decision from Cheungbased
on an intervening Supreme Court case setting forth a definition of who constituted a particular
social group. See Canada v. Ward, 2 S.C.R. 689 (1993). The court's reliance on this case is
somewhat misleading as Cheungis cited with approval in it. The only way in which the two cases
really can be distinguished is on the basis of sex: one involved a man and the other a woman.
Indeed, the court may have been influenced by the unstated fact that earlier in the year the
Immigration Board had issued guidelines calling for special consideration to be given to women
fleeing from repressive population policies. See Sterilization as Persecution, THE GAZErE
(Montreal), Apr. 7, 1993, at B2.
75. Man to Fight on for Refugee Status, THE GAZ= (Montreal), Feb. 11, 1994, at B1.
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money or preferential treatment, or the application of intense
psychological pressure from officials, neighbors, and co-workers? And
if such coercion does constitute a human rights abuse, what rights are
implicated-the civil and political rights referred to so far, or perhaps
economic and social rights? Similarly, if women fleeing repressive
population policies can be considered a particular social group for
protection under refugee laws, can women fleeing genital mutilation
or repressive social and legal norms that sanction sex discrimination
achieve the same status? How far can these concepts be stretched,
and should they be stretched as far as possible?
Critics of an expansive view of human rights argue that bringing
these sorts of injustices into the formal human rights arena signifi-
cantly dilutes the force of international human rights instruments and
organizations. They also contend that Canada and the United States
will be inundated with refugees if these broad sorts of abuses are
recognized by refugee law. The public/private distinction in human
rights discourse also is implicated in this context. Critics ask how a
court should determine whether applicants are telling the truth when
they claim to be the victims of repressive state population policies, as
these violations so often concern private behavior. Behind all of these
questions is the larger issue of whether the United States or Canada
can and should be a haven for anyone who claims asylum, even
legitimately.
Finally, the issue of the repressive nature of China's population
policy illustrates how human rights activities can be tied inextricably
to national and international politics and, to a substantial degree,
shaped by those politics. For example, opposition to Chinese
population policies has, since the early 1980s, been a touchstone of
the Reagan and Bush administrations and various right-to-life
politicians and groups in the United States.76 Due to the source of
this opposition, a number of those who might have been expected to
76. In 1990, President Bush signed an executive order requiring "enhanced consideration"
to be given to individuals expressing fear of persecution because of forced abortion or
sterilization. Exec. Order No. 12,711, 55 Fed. Reg. 13,897 (1990), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. § 1101
(1988 & Supp. V 1993). In 1992, the General Counsel for the INS issued a directive
strengthening this requirement. See Al Kamen, Defying Politics on Boat Pekpe: INS Counsel
Confounds Administration Convention on Haitians, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1992, at A19. In January
1993, shortly before he left office, the Attorney General promulgated a final rule formalizing
President Bush's Executive Order. See Guo Chua Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858, 862-64 (E.D.
Va. 1994). This rule never was published and never came into effect. SeeLizette Alvarez, China's
"One-Couple One-Chil" CHI. TRIB.,June 1, 1992, at 8; Simon Beck, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST,
Jan. 30, 1994, at 7; Marlow Hood, Riding the Snake; LA. TIMES MAO., June 30, 1993, at 12;
Randolph Ryan, Birth Rights? Asylum Case Cites China's Family Limit, BOSTON GLOBE, May 10,
1994, at Metro 1.
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be outspoken about China's abuses have muted their criticism for fear
of being identified with the right-to-life movement. 7 Paradoxically,
despite the vocal opposition of this movement, it has also been
difficult for the United States or any government or international
organization to adopt any significant measures to counter China's
repressive policies; China is simply too populous and important a
country to be ostracized by the international community or individual
governments. Thus, Haiti or South Africa can be isolated for human
rights violations of a traditional nature, but China escapes meaningful
censure for both traditional human rights abuses and the pervasive
and widespread abuse of women's reproductive rights.
C. Prenatal Sex Selection
The third example of the use of a human rights approach to bring
about legal change at the local level deals with prenatal sex selection,
a phenomenon that recently has generated growing concern in both
developed and developing countries, among them India. This
example involves legislative action to eliminate restrictive reproductive
policies, rather than a court challenge to such policies.
As far back as the early 1980s, many women's and social groups in
India were troubled about the growing use of prenatal sex selection
tests, such as amniocentesis and ultrasound, as a step in the process
of aborting female fetuses. One of the primary causes of the growth
of this practice has been the inferior role that women traditionally
have been accorded in Indian society." In many families, they have
been valued less highly than men because they are unable to carry on
the family name and are thought to be unable to contribute as much
as men to the work necessary to feed families and support their
parents in old age. In addition, females have been considered a
burden because of the great importance Indian culture places on
77. After coming to office, the Clinton administration initially reversed this policy and
opposed plaintiffs making this argument in immigration hearings. See Simon Beck, Reno Rejects
Birth Polity in Asylum Bids, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 15,1993, at 9; Simon Beck, SOUTH
CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 13,1994, at 5; Moneyline: Illegal ChineseImmigration Costs U.S. Billions
(CNN television broadcast, July 19, 1994), transcript available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File.
78. For discussion of the status of women in India and the relationship of the law to this
status, see SRIKANTA GHOSH, WOMEN AND CRIME (1993); WOMENPOWER: STATUS OF WOMEN IN
INDIA (Ashak Kumar ed., 1991); QUEST FOR GENDERJUSTICE: A CRITIQUE OF THE STATUS OF
WOMEN IN INDIA (S.L. Raj ed., 1991); IRAKASH PNDU SINGH, WOMEN, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE
IN INDIA (1989); MOHINDERJIT K. TEjA, DOWRY: A STUDY IN ATITUDES AND PRACTICES (1993);
H.C. UPADHYAY, STATUS OF WOMEN IN INDIA (1991); R. VENKATACHALAM & VgI SRINwASAM,
FEMALE INFANTICIDE (1993); Gita Gopal, Gender and Economic Inequality in India: The Legal
Connection, 13 B.C. THD WORLD LJ. 63 (1993); A. Newman, For Richer or Poorer, TilDeathDo Us
Part: India's Response to Douny Deaths, 15 ILSAJ. INT'L L. 109 (1992).
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dowry. Although dowry is officially illegal, families often must pay
many times their annual income as dowry so that their daughters can
be married. In the process, they often borrow from family and
friends and fall deeply in debt.
One response to this situation by some families has been the
infanticide of female newborn children or their neglect to the point
of early childhood death. With the advent of prenatal sex selection,
this maltreatment of females has been carried one step further to the
abortion of female fetuses. The Indian Government's official drive to
convince women to give birth to male children and thus lower the
rate of population growth has added to the pressures. If couples may
only bear one or two children, the pressure is all the greater to
determine beforehand that these children will be male and, if not, to
abort them. It is believed that every year ten percent of all Indian
women undergo sex preselection tests79 and 50,000 female fetuses
are aborted."0 Indeed, India has one of the most unbalanced ratios
of women to men in the world: 929/1000 in 1991-down from
972/1000 in 1901. Due to all causes of neglect, an estimated thirty-
seven million women are "missing" in India.82
To counteract this practice, many women's groups and social
activists have lobbied Parliament for over a decade to prohibit, as a
form of sex discrimination, prenatal sex selection except in very
limited circumstances.8  The concern has become particularly acute
with the recent proliferation of mobile ultrasound clinics in the
countryside.8 4 In 1994, these groups finally achieved their goals with
the enactment of the Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation
and Prevention of Misuse) Act.' Under the Act, all genetic counsel-
79. Nabanita Sirear Drona, Females as Defects, IRISH TIMES, May 30, 1994, at 10.
80. Mahesh Uniyal, India-Population: Bans Sex Tests to Stop Female Feticide, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Aug. 10, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
81. John-Thor Dahlburg, TheFight to Savelndia's Baby Girls, LA. TIMES, Feb. 22,1994, atAl.
The normal ratio is 105 males to 100 females at birth, but an average of 100 to 100 by adult life.
82. Ellen Hale, Our Crowded Planet: A Woman's Burden: Modern Technology Makes Women
Disposable in Asia, GANE= NEwS SERVICE, July 10, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
83. John F. Bums, India Fights Abortion of Female Fetuses, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1994, at 5; see
also Indian Social Groups Welcome Sex Test Ban, REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, July 27, 1994.
In 1988 the legislature of the Indian state Maharashtra enacted legislation placing restrictions
on these procedures. Maharashtra Regulation of the Use of Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques
Act of 1988, 4 MAHARASHTRA GOV'T GAzETr E 109-18 (1988), repinted in 15 ANN. REV. OF POP.
L 316, 316-24 (1989).
84. See Bums, supra note 83, at 5.
85. Act No. 57 of Sept. 20, 1994; see also Christopher Thomas, Foetal Sex Tests Banned in Boy-
Crazy India, THE TIMES (London),July 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File;
Uniyal, supra note 80. There was some opposition in women's groups to this Act. See Bums,
supra note 83, at 5.
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ling centers must be registered and doctors are prohibited from
revealing the sex of tested fetuses or advertising for prenatal gender
testing. In addition, testing is to be carried out only for legitimate
scientific purposes, such as to detect genetic and congenital abnormal-
ities and diseases or other abnormalities specified by a board
established under the Act. These tests may be performed only on
women who are over thirty-five years old, have had two or more
spontaneous abortions, or have been exposed to radiation, infection,
chemicals, or drugs harmful to the fetus. Pregnant women with a
family history of mental retardation, physical deformities, or genetic
disease also may be tested. Persons working in the clinics, as well as
women using clinics and their families, are liable for fines and
imprisonment for violating the Act.
In one sense, adoption of the Act can be viewed as a successful
challenge to a particularly virulent form of sex discrimination which
has been called part of the "social fabric of prejudice" of India.86 It
raises, however, some important and disturbing issues that must be
confronted every time discriminatory acts are addressed by legislative
action. Some relate to the specific content of the Act. For example,
it punishes women who undergo sex preselection tests unless they
have been forced to do so. This provision ignores the fact that,
although perhaps not literally forced, Indian women are under
intense pressure from their husbands and in-laws to obtain the tests.
Refusing to be tested can lead to scorn, rejection, mistreatment, and
even death at the hands of irate in-laws. In effect, the Act penalizes
those who are themselves victims.
s7
Even if this deficiency was corrected, however, there would remain
other troubling issues. First, will the Act be effective? Despite the
required registration of centers, the fetal testing procedure is so easy
to perform that it will be very difficult to monitor compliance in any
meaningful way. Testing simply may be driven underground, where
doctors will charge extortionate fees to carry out tests. The experi-
ence with two other social evils prohibited by Indian law, infanticide
and dowry, is instructive. Because the laws regulating them are not
strongly enforced, neither has been eradicated. A second concern is
whether the new legislation will result in an increase of more
pernicious acts of sex discrimination, such as female infanticide or
willful neglect of female children. When questioned about this, some
86. Indian Social Groups Welcome Sex Test Ban, supra note 83.
87. The Act does nothing to register actual ultrasound equipment, which is highly portable
and can be moved from place to place to establish clandestine clinics.
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women have responded that it is better to abort a fetus than to kill a
child or subject it to the hard life that they themselves have experi-
enced.8
Third is the issue of whether the Act conflicts with a woman's
fundamental right to make her own decisions about reproduction. Its
approval poses difficult questions. For example, is discrimination
against female fetuses a more serious denial of rights than denial of
the right to an abortion; or is aborting a fetus because it is female any
different in result than aborting a fetus for any other reason? And
does denying a woman the right to abort a fetus on this ground
seriously compromise her reproductive rights as a whole? Given the
importance of reproductive rights and the near certainty that the Act
cannot be enforced, there may be better ways to address the problem.
Possible solutions include attempting to change the attitude of Indian
society about the value of female children, enforcing the dowry laws
more strictly, or, as one Indian State has tried to do, providing
financial incentives to parents who raise female children. 9 Although
these strategies may not work, it is possible that pursuing them may
cause less harm than banning sex preselection tests. These are
complex issues, and they will attract increasing attention as prenatal
sex selection becomes more commonly used in all parts of the world,
as well as prenatal testing for all kinds of genetic traits, many of which
are considered to be medically or socially undesirable.
D. Spousal Veto Requirements
A final example of the use of a human rights approach to bring
about legal change at the local level involves the policy of requiring
a woman seeking to use family planning to obtain her spouse's
consent. A recent Constitutional Court case from Costa Rica focuses
on this issue and illustrates perhaps the best-case scenario for all
actions involving reproductive rights."0 The plaintiffs in the case, a
number of women's groups and individual women, challenged the
constitutionality of the interpretation by medical authorities of Costa
Rica's recent 1990 Decree legalizing sterilizations for therapeutic
purposes. They claimed that, despite the absence of specific
authorizing language in the Decree, these authorities were requiring
married women to obtain the permission of their spouses before a
88. Dahlburg, supra note 81, at 1.
89. Dahlburg, supra note 81, at 1.
90. Case No. 2196-92 (Costa Rica Aug. 11, 1992) (unpublished).
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sterilization was performed. They argued that this interpretation was
in violation of various provisions of Costa Rica's Constitution guaran-
teeing equality of the sexes and of spouses. They also claimed that it
violated provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, which prohibit discrimination with
respect to legal capacity and family planning. The medical authorities
in the case denied interpreting the Decree in this fashion.
The Court rejected the plaintiffs' challenge, ruling that there was
no evidence that the medical authorities had required married
women to obtain their husbands' permission to be sterilized.
Nonetheless, due to the importance of the issue, the Court took the
opportunity to provide an interpretive opinion on the question raised
by the plaintiffs. It then proceeded to deliver a forceful human-rights-
based defense of women's autonomy. It reasoned that an interpreta-
tion of the Decree such as that charged by the plaintiffs would be in
violation of the principles of liberty, equality, nondiscrimination, and
the equal treatment of spouses. The Court asserted that these
considerations had inspired the Women's Convention, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
as well as the Costa Rican Law on the Social Equality of Women.91
Moreover, the Court gave expansive support to these rights. It
concluded, among other things, that the decision of a woman of legal
capacity with respect to decisions about her life could be made
subordinate to no one, including her husband. It noted that the
democratic system of Costa Rica was based on a theory of liberty that
allowed every person to grow and develop freely in all areas of life,
including sexual areas. It held that the right to health and life
required that a woman be the only person given authority to make a
decision on therapeutic sterilization. In support of its decision, the
Court noted disapprovingly that, under the alleged interpretation of
the Decree, maternity would become the obligation of a woman, to
be valued above her right to health and life. The Court further stated
that its opinion applied to single, widowed, and divorced women as
well as to women in de facto relationships and married women who
were over the age of fifteen but under the age of legal majority.
This decision is the result of a convergence of fortuitous factors:
a government that has taken seriously its commitment to the human
rights treaties that it has ratified; a legal system that, like Colombia's,
91. Act of Feb. 22, 1990 on the Promotion of the Social Equality of Women, translated into
English in 17 ANN. REv. Pop. L. 472, 472-79 (1990).
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recently has been reformed to be more receptive to constitutional
challenges;92 a court that is willing to go beyond what is technically
necessary to support human rights arguments; and a relatively easy
case in the sense that a requirement that a husband approve his wife's
sterilization finds no support in the text of the Decree and is clearly
in violation of all sorts of legal prohibitions of sex discrimination.
The decision, moreover, sets an important precedent for the future.
To be sure, the case does not involve the most significant reproduc-
tive issue that could have been addressed. The Court made clear, in
fact, that it was dealing only with therapeutic sterilization, not
sterilization for family planning purposes, which still is prohibited in
Costa Rica. Nonetheless, the opinion supports the full equality of
women not only in decisions about therapeutic sterilization, but in all
areas of life. It also acknowledges that human rights include freedom
of sexual expression, full personal development, and, most significant-
ly, freedom from becoming a mother at the expense of health. These
human rights statements certainly could be used in the future to
argue against many kinds of sex discrimination, as well as abortion
laws that result in harm to women's mental and physical health, and
that deny the full development of their personalities.
CONCLUSION
The effort to reform abusive population policies and restrictive
reproductive health laws through human-rights-based local legal
action faces major challenges. Among these are the ability of the
legal system to address these issues, the suitability of particular topics
for legal action (either legislative orjudicial), and the particular legal
strategies to be employed. On many occasions, these efforts are
influenced strongly by national and international political consider-
ations. Nonetheless, as some of the case studies examined above
illustrate, it is increasingly possible to tackle these issues and prevail
by using human rights arguments and conventions. As countries
place increasing importance on human rights conventions that they
have ratified, and incorporate human rights standards into their legal
systems, these kinds of cases undoubtedly will become more common.
Those engaged in the struggle for humane population policies and
full reproductive rights need to take this opportunity to shape human
rights arguments to support such positive goals.
92. See generally Robert S. Barker, Taking Constitutionalim Seriously: Costa Rica's Sala Cuarta,
6 RA.J. INT'L L. 349 (1991).
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